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INTRODUCTION
During past decades, anti-Marxist concerns stemming from the
Cold War era shaped United States foreign policy towards sub-
Saharan Africa.' The United States containment strategy constrained
trade relations with the African region to particular strategic inter-
ests, which resulted in its economic marginalization in the wake of
the Soviet Union's collapse.2 In the current era, the prospect of a uni-
fied global economy drives the agendas of contemporary administra-
tions, thereby re-characterizing the former adversarial nature of in-
ternational relations.3  During the Clinton Administration in
particular, the international community made great strides towards
increased international trade, foreign investment, privatization, and
4global economic cooperation. Notwithstanding these advances, po-
1. See Jon H. Sylvester, Sub-Saharan Africa: Economic Stagnation, Political
Disintegration, and the Specter of Recolonization, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1299,
1312 (1994) (noting that the United States competed with the Soviet Union to be-
friend various African States considered strategically important due to their abun-
dance of natural resources and the availability of strategic locations for ports and
air bases).
2. See A. Peter Mutharika, The Role of International Law in the Twenty-First
Century: An African Perspective, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1706, 1710 (1995) (not-
ing the marginalization of Africa by the international community due in part to the
loss of strategic importance and the lack of economic lure of the region in the post-
Cold War era). In 1994, Africa represented only two percent of United States for-
eign trade. See Carol Thompson, In Focus: Economic Policy Toward Africa, 2
FOREIGN POL'Y IN Focus 23 (last modified Jan. 1997) <http://www.foreignpolicy-
infocus.org/briefs/vol2/v2n23eaf.html> (attributing an increase in United States aid
to Africa in 1985 to United States-Soviet tensions).
3. See, e.g., Twenty-third Western Economic Summit, BULLETIN EU (last
modified July 8, 1997) <http://www.europa.eu.int./search97cgi/s.. .te=EC-HTML>
(statement of the Group of Seven) (noting the significance of the commitment of
the heads of state of the seven major industrial democracies-the Group of Seven
Nations-to globalization as a means for world growth). The Group of Seven Na-
tions consists of the United States, Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom,
Italy, and Canada. See id. With the gradual increase of market-oriented economies,
the International Monetary Fund ("IMF") envisions a uniform international eco-
nomic order. See THE UNIQUE NATURE OF THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE IMF: THE
CODE OF CONDUCT IN DIVERSE CIRCUMSTANCES, IMF PAMPHLET SERIES, No. 46
(1992), available in <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/pam/pam46/pam4606.
htm> (discussing the institution's role in facilitating the transition to a universal
economic regime).
4. See All Free Traders Now?, ECONOMIST, Dec. 7, 1996, at 21 (noting that
during the 1990s international trade outpaced world output, and foreign direct in-
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litical, social, and economic instability in most of the sub-Saharan
African nations-including extreme poverty, corruption, civil vio-
lence, environmental pollution, underdevelopment, and despotism-
precluded the region from participation in global integration initia-
tives.
5
In 1999, a different reality exists in sub-Saharan Africa-the re-
gion is ripe for greater economic assimilation into the international
community.6 During 1995 and 1996, thirty-five sub-Saharan African
countries averaged growth rates of approximately five percent, more
than doubling the growth rates of the previous decade." Indeed, today
the region harbors nearly 700 million inhabitants and an immensly
rich natural resource base.8 Due to its unique history of turmoil, how-
ever, sub-Saharan African economic development will require spe-
vestment increased by 40% in 1995).
5. See expanding Trade with Sub-Saharan Africa: Hearings Before the Sub-
committee on Trade of the House Ways and Means Committee, 105th Cong. 2-3
(1997) (statement of H.E. Newai Gebre-Ab, Chief Economic Advisor to the Prime
Minister of Ethiopia) (testifying about the international marginalization of Ethiopia
and other sub-Saharan nations due to consistent internal strife). The European
Economic Community, even after the colonial era, has historically given more at-
tention to Africa than the United States. See generally European Union, Europa,
Development Policy (visited Apr. 16, 1999) <http://europa.eu.int/pol/dev
/info.en.htm> (emphasizing that the Lom6 Convention, signed in 1975, is "far and
away the most important regional agreement" for assisting most of the developed
world, including the seventy African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries).
6. See WORLD BANK, 1997 ANNUAL REPORT 37 (1997) [hereinafter 1997
WORLD BANK REPORT] (stating that "sub-Saharan Africa's economic recovery
both accelerated and spread to more countries in 1996"). Specifically, gross do-
mestic product ("GDP") growth accelerated in twenty-three countries, seven coun-
tries reversed their GDP decline, and thirty-four countries recorded an improve-
ment in per capita income. See id. Many African nations implemented economic
policy reforms in an effort to open their economies to the global community. See
Council on Foreign Relations, Promoting U.S. Economic Relations With Africa,
AFRICA NEWs, May 1997 <http://www.africanews.org/usaf/crftaskforce.html>
(statement of The Task Force) (discussing the "significant positive developments
in Africa," including a new leadership promoting a reform agenda). Indeed, The
Task Force further recognized the "favorable economic and political trends in most
African countries." Id.
7. See 1997 WORLD BANK REPORT, supra note 6, at 37 (discussing aggregate
growth rates for thirty-five African countries in 1995 and 1996).
8. See id. (discussing the demographics and topography of sub-Sahara Af-
rica).
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cial consideration to avoid further exploitation and bring the long-
ignored region on par with the rest of the world.9
At the dawn of Africa's rising fortunes, the United States govern-
ment is considering whether to adopt formally its first official trade
policy towards the sub-Saharan region' ° through the proposed Afri-
can Growth and Opportunity Act ("African Growth Act")." This bill
primarily seeks to implement a liberalized trade agenda, establishing
the nations of sub-Saharan Africa as economic partners with the
United States. 12 In its present form, however, the African Growth Act
would increase the market-opening pressures of globalization"-
forces that continue to generate a large global underclass. " Thus, to
9. See Brian B.A. McAllister, The United Nations Conference on Environ-
ment and Development: Opportunity to Forge a New Unity in the Work of the
World Bank Among Human Rights, the Environment, and Sustainable Develop-
ment, 16 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 689, 700-14 (1993) (listing several in-
cidents where World Trade Organization ("WTO") and IMF structural adjustment
initiatives had various adverse effects on human rights, the environment, and the
political and social climate in sub-Saharan Africa); see also Council of Foreign
Relations, supra note 6 (concluding that "African renewal .. . while largely self-
generated, will nevertheless require significant international support and enhanced
development consideration if it is to be sustained").
10. See African Growth and Opportunity Act: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Finance, 105th Cong. 2 (1998), available in 1998 WL 325460 [herein-
after June 17, 1998 Senate Finance Comm. Hearings] (statement of Madeleine K.
Albright, Secretary of State) (announcing that "we [the United States] undertake
the most fundamental change in our policy towards Africa since the independence
movement blossomed on that continent four decades ago").
11. H.R. 1432, 105th Cong. (1998). The U.S. House of Representatives passed
the Act on March 11, 1998, with bipartisan backing. See 144 CONG. REC. H 1040-
02, H 1084 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1998) (recorded votes) (tallying the final vote on the
African Growth and Opportunity Act ("African Growth Act") at 233 to 186 with
both Democrats and Republicans voting in favor).
12. See 142 CONG. REC. E1725-02 2 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1996) (statement of
Sen. Crane) (referring to sub-Saharan Africa's participation in the global market-
place as a step towards the nations in the region emerging as business partners
rather than aid recipients).
13. See discussion infra Part III.A (analyzing how the African Growth Act
forces IMF/WTO compliance).
14. See John T. Pass6-Smith, The Persistence of the Gap: Taking Stock of Eco-
nomic Growth in the Post-World War II Era, in DEVELOPMENT &
UNDERDEVELOPMENT: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INEQUALITY 15, 27-28
(Mitchell A. Seligson & John T. Pass6-Smith eds., 1993) [hereinafter
DEVELOPMENT & UNDERDEVELOPMENT] (concluding that the gap between sub-
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many scholars the African Growth Act represents an unfettered op-
portunity for the United States' capitalist machine to fiurther exploit
Third World resources. 5
Recent history suggests that economic dominance, not nuclear ca-
pability, is the coveted and feared weapon of the day.t" Recognizing
the changing tide of international relations, the international commu-
nity should empower developing nations to safeguard themselves
against possible economic exploitation. 7 Primarily, the poorest na-
tions of this region need a shield to defend themselves against the
neo-colonial weaponry of the modem world order. This Comment
concludes that a modified version of "modem internal economic self-
determination" is the only plausible form of protection that would
allow sub-Saharan African countries to manage their own economic
development. 8
Part I of this Comment examines two primary provisions of the
African Growth Act, while offering a developmental perspective on
how to assess the policies contained therein. Part II discusses the mi-
raculous growth experience of East Asia-the East Asian Para-
digm-as a catalyst of the modem global trade paradigm that has
evolved in the international arena. Part III demonstrates how the
modem international system indirectly forces developing nations to
accept and adopt the modem global trade paradigm-the so-called
Neo-Classical Paradigm-that often proves disastrous for fledgling
economies. Inherent weaknesses in the Neo-Classical framework
have created a dramatic increase in the underclass of East Asian na-
Saharan Africa and rich countries, measured by per capita GDP, increased an aver-
age of S232 every year since 1962 compared to an annual rise of S142 in other
poor countries).
15. See discussion infra Part I1I.B (discussing how the international system of-
ten proves harmful to developing nations).
16. See Steven Arnold, Fron the Cold War to Cold Hearts? International De-
velopinent in Search of its Future, in IDEAS AND INFO ABOUT DEVELOPING
EDUCATION 3, 4 (1996) (stating that multinational corporations are increasingly
assuming the power of determining resource allocation).
17. See FANTU CHERU, THE SILENT REVOLUTION IN AFRICA 2-6 (1993) (dis-
cussing the extreme poverty, lack of economic development, and overall disap-
pointing progress of Africa from the 1960s through the late 1980s).
18. See discussion infra Part V (advocating "self-determination" as Africa's
shield against globalization).
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tions and other nations around the world. Accordingly, this section
illustrates the underclass phenomenon in order to understand the rise
of anti-globalization movements that exist today. Part IV analyzes
the current legal state of self-determination, a modem right that some
scholars believe should be expanded beyond the colonial context. Fi-
nally, Part V of this Comment provides to the international commu-
nity recommendations on interpreting the modem right of self-
determination so as to bridge the current legal gap that prevents sub-
Saharan African nations from using this principle as a means of pro-
tection from destructive global market pressures.
I. THE AFRICAN GROWTH AND OPPORTUNITY
ACT
A. PROVISIONS
The African Growth Act arrived on the floor of the United States
House of Representatives with strong support from all parts of the
political spectrum, including President Clinton.' 9 Yet, the bill created
an immediate undercurrent of intense criticism, emanating predomi-
nantly from African lobbying organizations and environmental and
human rights groups.20 Nevertheless, the House of Representatives
19. See Guy Gugliotta, Africa Trade Bill Passes House; Legislation to Liber-
alize Policy Overcomes Strong Opposition, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 1998, at A4
(stating that 92 Democrats and 141 Republicans voted in favor of the African
Growth Act, which was embraced by the Clinton Administration). President
Clinton's administration, in fact, established a new economic approach to African
development for the upcoming period. See U.S. African Trade: Before the Sub-
comms. of Africa and Int'l Econ. Policy & Trade of the House Comm. on Int'l Re-
lations, 105th Cong. 2 (1997), available in 1997 WL 277066 [hereinafter Deputy
U.S. Trade Rep. Remarks] (statement of Jeffrey Lang, Deputy United States Trade
Representative) (announcing the administration's "Partnership for Promoting Eco-
nomic Growth and Opportunities in Africa" Program as the executive approach for
implementing trade relations with sub-Saharan Africa). The Deputy United States
Trade Representative further explained that the "partnership begins with the simple
but powerful idea that American firms are best served if they view African coun-
tries as partners in trade and investment." Id.
20. See generally TransAfrica, 28 Prominent African Americans Urge Senate
To Modify The African Growth and Opportunity Act (visited Apr. 16, 1999)
<http://www.citizen.org/pctrade/Africa/transafr.htm> (expressing several reserva-
tions about the current provisions of the bill); see also Letter from the Honorable
Jesse Jackson, Jr., Congressman, to the Honorable Philip Crane, Congressman (last
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passed the legislation since it cedes to the President the power to ad-
dress the problems that the bill's opponents predict will arise after
the Act's implementation. 2' The Senate subsequently failed to vote
on the bill. According to Congressman McDermott, one of the bill's
co-sponsors, however, Congress will certainly reintroduce similar
legislation next term, which would allow a Senate vote on the com-
panion bill.'
In its proposed form, the African Growth Act seeks to establish
several key initiatives.2 For the purposes of this Comment, only two
modified Mar. 10, 1998) <http:l/wwwv.citizen.org/pctrade/Africaijessejr.htm> (ex-
pressing Representative Jackson's concerns about H.R. 1432).
21. See 144 CONG. REC. H1040-02, H1066 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1998) [herein-
after Rep. Royce Remarks] (statement of Rep. Royce) (claiming that the twelve
eligibility guidelines of the bill are merely general and that each need not be satis-
fied in order for a country to qualify for consideration under the United States pro-
gram). "The criteria call for countries to make as we say, and let me quote, 'con-
tinual progress toward establishing a market-based economy' relative to the 12
items listed in the bill." Id. The general consensus among House legislators was
that, although the bill was "not perfect," any flaws in the African Growth Act were
not serious enough to outweigh its benefits. See 144 CONG. REC. H1040-02,
H1068 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1998) (statement of Rep. Owens). Indeed, opening trade
relations with such a large, virtually untapped market is in the best economic inter-
est of the United States. See Deputy U.S. Trade Rep. Remarks, supra note 19
(stating that the United States cannot afford to ignore such a huge potential market
in Africa in the face of growing global economic competition). In fact, the Pream-
ble to the African Growth Act expressly includes the "mutual economic interest of
the United States and sub-Saharan Africa." H.R. 1432, 105th Cong. sec. 2 (1998).
22. See Telephone Interview with Jennifer Crider, Public Relations Coordina-
tor for Congressman McDermott (Nov. 15, 1998) (stating that although the current
version of the African Growth Act did not reach a vote in the Senate, a similar bill
will certainly be introduced in the next session).
23. See H.R. 1432, 105th Cong. sec. 6 (1998) (requiring the President to estab-
lish a United States/Sub-Saharan Africa Trade and Economic Forum, an initiative
to foster close economic ties between the governments and private sectors of the
two regions). Traditionally, aid has been the predominant characteristic of the re-
lationship between the United States and Africa. See Obstacles to U.S.-African
Trade and Investment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Africa and on Int 7 Econ.
Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on Int'l Relations, 105th Cong. 3-4 (1997)
(statement of David F. Gordon, Overseas Development Council) (commenting on
the two pillars that characterize the United States-African past policy: humanitar-
ian concerns and sustainable development through foreign assistance programs).
Due to rather mixed results and a decline in political support for aid programs, the
United States increasingly cut its budget in this area; much of the aid supplied to-
day is tied to strict enforcement requirements, which constrict the aid's overall ef-
fectiveness. See ANNE 0. KRUEGER, ECONOMIC POLICIES AT CROSS-PURPOSES 36
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provisions of the Act will be examined. The first provision seeks the
negotiation of a United States/Sub-Saharan Africa Free Trade Area
with country eligibility based on a list of criteria and the full discre-
tion of the President.24 The second provision strives to bring all eligi-
ble beneficiaries in compliance with World Trade Organization
("WTO") standards25 and to encourage exports by reauthorizing the
Generalized System of Preferences ("GSP") program26 for an en-
hanced list of products, 27 most notably textile goods.28 These two
(The Brookings Inst. ed., 1993). In fact, the United States completely denied aid
appropriations to the African Development Bank in 1997. See CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET OFFICE, A C.B.O. STUDY: THE ROLE OF FOREIGN AID IN DEVELOPMENT
66 (1997). The African Growth Act, however, does include some minimal assis-
tance measures. See H.R. 1432, 105th Cong. secs. 5, 10-12 (1998) (encouraging
various intergovernmental organizations-the United States Agency for Interna-
tional Development, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the Develop-
ment Fund for Africa, and the Export-Import Bank-to create assistance packages
for the implementation phase of the African Growth Act); see also id. sec. 13 (cre-
ating a new office for an Assistant Trade Representative to the sub-Saharan re-
gion).
24. See H.R. 1432, 105th Cong. sec. 7 (1998) (declaring and describing the
U.S.-Sub-Saharan Africa Free Trade Area); id. sec. 4 (offering twelve criteria that
the President would use in determining the eligibility of countries as trading part-
ners). Whether a country must satisfy all of the eligibility requirements of the Act,
or whether the list is merely suggestive and flexible has created great controversy.
Compare TransAfrica, supra note 20, at 2 (complaining that Section 4 would re-
quire annual certification via the list of new requirements), with Rep. Royce Re-
marks, supra note 21 (urging that the African Growth Act merely offers general
guidelines and each criterion need not be satisfied).
25. See H.R. 1432, 105th Cong. sec. 4(b)(2)(B) (1998) (stating that a nation's
eligibility will be partly based upon its pursuit of WTO membership).
26. See Trade Act of 1974 sub. ch. V, 19 U.S.C. sec. 2461 (1994 & Supp.)
(amended 1976, 1979, and 1985) (establishing the Generalized System of Prefer-
ences ("GSP") program, which gives duty free treatment to a list of specified
goods for a specific period of time). Section 24 6 3(a) lists articles to be considered
for designation. See id. sec. 2463(a). The Africa Growth Act amends Section
503(a)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974. See H.R. 1432, 105th Cong. sec. 9 (stating
"[s]ection 503(a)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974 [19 U.S.C. sec. 2463(a)(1)] is
amended").
27. See H.R. 1432, 105th Cong. secs. 8-9 (1998) (amending and extending the
GSP program to include non-import-sensitive goods).
28. See id. sec. 8(b)(2) (revealing the African Growth Act's heavy emphasis
upon expansion of the textile industry as a way of fortifying and diversifying Afri-
can industry). United States textile unions and workers represent a large part of the
domestic resistance to the passage of this bill due to their fears that their jobs will
either be exported overseas or lost to the cheaper goods of foreign competitors. See
1446 [14:1439
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provisions certify the United States' adoption of a trade liberalization
strategy towards sub-Saharan Africa-a paradigm very similar to
those employed with little success in the past by the International
Monetary Fund ("IMF") 9 and in the North American Free Trade
Agreement ("NAFTA").' °
B. A DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE ON THE AFRICAN GROWTH
ACT
Since trade liberalization is the goal, it is not surprising that the
United States corporate sector is one of the African Growth Act's
largest proponents.3 Multinational corporations stand to acquire
many new resources and much new business via expanded market
access if Congress ratifies a similar bill." With increased global
trading in recent years, transnational corporations have assumed a
supreme position in the world hierarchy, seizing many of the roles
June 17, 1998 Senate Finance Conmm. Hearings, supra note 10, at 5 (statement of
Mark Levinson, Chief Economist, Union of Needletrades, Industrial, and Textile
Employees) (remarking that the United States textile labor force dropped by 14%
in four years due to the GSP program under the NAFTA). Textile lobbies also
portend a transshipment problem due to the African Growth Act's low point-of-
origin standards. See 144 CONG. REC. H1040-02, H 1044 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1998)
(statement of Rep. Burton) (expressing fear that the 35% value-added standard will
be exploited by Chinese textile manufacturers trying to take advantage of the duty
free treatment of African goods).
29. See infi'a Part III.B (discussing the IMF's formula of indiscriminate capital
account liberalization and Thailand's experience in the early 1990s).
30. See generally Public Citizen, The Failed Experiment: NAFTA at Three
Years (visited Apr. 18, 1999) <http://vvw.citizen.org/pctradelnaftaireports.epi
joint.htm> (analyzing in its Executive Summary the policies and rather devastating
results of the free trade agreement).
31. See Public Citizen, Meet the Multinational Corporations Behind the Lugar-
Crane Africa Bill (visited Apr. 16, 1999) <http:/iwww.citizen.orgipctrade/tmde-
home/factsheet.html> (listing Amoco, Caterpillar, Chevron, Enron, General Elec-
tric, K-Mart, Mobil, Occidental Petroleum, and Texaco as some of the major cor-
porate proponents).
32. See Abid Aslam, US Discovers an African Trade Bonanza (visited Apr. 16,
1999) <http://v-v.mg.co.za/mg/news/97apr2/24apr-trade.html> (noting that the
return on United States corporate investments in Africa consists of three times the
worldwide rate in recent years); see also Jessica T. Mathews, Power Shift, 76
FoREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 50, 57 (noting that private capital flows have
grown twice as fast as trade, shifting more power to corporations and leaving gov-
ernments less free choice in setting economic rules).
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previously performed by States.33 Foreign direct investment, the fast-
est growing, most abundant form of financing in today's market, bol-
sters the power of these corporations and makes their influence in
politics all the more prevalent. 4 The corporations' profit-maximizing
motives, however, may prove quite destructive to a developing na-
tion's weak domestic industries.35
Corporate interests aside, the benefits realized from incremental
degrees of trade liberalization are undeniable. Global trading net-
works have absorbed increased exports from all sectors, which has
allowed the further expansion of certain industries and increased the
flow of foreign capital, essential for development efforts.36 The
world, however, also has witnessed the devastation of economies
governed purely by market forces.37 Many scholars therefore reject
33. See Arnold, supra note 16, at 4 (arguing that multinational corporations are
becoming increasingly powerful and replacing democracy with a sort of global
corporate dictatorship).
34. See generally OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE, FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT FLOWS TO LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES: A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE
(Briefing Paper No. 3, Sept. 1997) (stating that of all forms of financing, foreign
direct investment is preferable and grown to 35% of all official flows of capital in
1996).
35. See Mathews, supra note 32, at 63-65 (describing the weakening of gov-
emment power in the area of economics in the face of growing markets and in-
creased corporate competition, a fact that may lead to increased conflicts).
36. See Albert Fishlow & Catherine Gwin, Lessons from the East Asian Expe-
rience, in MIRACLE OR DESIGN? LESSONS FROM THE EAST ASIAN EXPERIENCE 1, 9
(Overseas Dev. Council Policy Essay No. 11, 1994) [hereinafter MIRACLE OR
DESIGN?] (certifying that the world economy could handle a massive expansion of
exports from all the developing countries, even if the countries grow at a rate equal
to that of the East Asian markets). A World Bank study predicts that if all the de-
veloping countries expand at rates similar to those of the Newly Industrialized
Countries ("NICs"), their imports to markets in the United States, the European
Community, and Japan would amount only to 3.7% of the total of these three mar-
kets. See THE WORLD BANK, THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND
PUBLIC POLICY 361 (1993) (discussing the World Bank's study); CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 23, at 17-18 (stating that the countries that have re-
cently attracted the greatest amount of private capital experienced vigorous growth
rates between 1990 and 1994). Sub-Saharan African nations received only three
billion United States dollars in private capital in 1994. See id.
37. See discussion infra notes 98-102 and accompanying text (reviewing the
collapse of the Thai economy when its capital sector was virtually fully liberal-
ized).
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cookie-cutter models for economic development." Accordingly, it is
necessary to examine the Neo-Classical Trade Paradigm," which un-
derlies the modem international economic system and the African
Growth Act, to adequately assess the policies contained in the Act.
Prior to this examination, it is necessary to discuss the past growth
experience of East Asia as a prelude to the modem economic order.
II. THE EAST ASIAN PARADIGM
A. PRELUDE TO THE MODERN ECONOMIC ORDER
Over the span of approximately three decades, the nations of East
Asia have ascended from the ranks of economic underdevelopment
to a status rivaling most highly developed nations.4' This extraordi-
nary experience has left development theorists and economists alike
wondering how to duplicate such fast-paced growth in other devel-
oping countries. In spite of the mixed speculation and failed para-
38. See JAMES H. MITTELMAN & MUSTAPHA KAMAL PASHA, OUT FROM
UNDERDEVELOPMENT REVISrrED 242 (Timothy M. Shaw ed., 1997) (noting that
countries vary greatly according to their historical structures, resources, and cul-
tural norms, which makes a prescriptive approach to development unworkable);
Makau Wa Mutua, The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural Fingerprint: An
Evaluation of the Language of Duties, 35 VA. J. INT'L. L. 339, 341 (1995) (assert-
ing that the Western notion of liberalism cannot adequately respond to the histori-
cal, political, and social conditions of Africa). Mutua states that the "individualist,
narrow formation of human rights is not sufficient to pull the African continent
back from the abyss." Id. at 340. Currently, Africa's Charter on Human and Peo-
ple's Rights-the Banjul Charter--departs from the "narrow formalities of other
regional and international human rights instruments." Id. at 339.
39. See MrrTELMAN & PASHA, supra note 38, at 133 (explaining that neo-
classical theorists see outward economic orientation, implying trade liberalization,
as the key to development); see also infra Part III (discussing the Neo-Classical
Paradigm).
40. See MIrELMAN & PASHA, supra note 38, at 130 (stating that the new or-
thodoxy in international development showcases the NICs' experience).
41. See id. at 131 (illustrating the dramatically improved conditions of this re-
gion, including sustained average GDP growth rates between eight and ten percent
for nearly two decades).
42. See id. at 133 (arguing that the NICs' experience has proliferated neo-
classical ideals, such as free-market access and fast-paced global integration, as the
prescription for economic success in the global South). Prior to the growth period
of the NICs, the prominent development orthodoxy, called "modernization theory,"
represented a simplified model of the various stages a traditional society passes
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digms of the 1970s and 1980s, the liberalized market economy has
emerged as the dominant structure promoted by most economic
scholars. 43 Accordingly, market liberalization has become the hall-
mark of the new global capitalist movement and is couched within
the African Growth Act.44 Recently, however, scholarly research
suggests that there are significant contradictions between this modem
liberalization market theory and the methods employed by East
Asian nations to develop their economies.
B. LESSONS FROM THE EAST ASIAN NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZED
COUNTRIES ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCE AND THEIR
IMPLICATIONS FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
The World Bank recently conducted a comprehensive study-the
first of its kind on the East Asian region by a multinational institu-
tion-about the remarkable growth experience of the economies of
through on its path to industrialization. See id. at 37-38. Thus, subsequent experi-
ence taught scholars that there is more to the development formula than the mere
imposition of a rigid framework upon all societies, each exhibiting varying socio-
political cultures. See id. at 242.
43. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 1998 ANNUAL REPORT 51-52
[hereinafter 1998 IMF ANNUAL REPORT] (discussing a renewed call for trade lib-
eralization efforts by the IMF in member and non-member countries). In 1997, the
directors of the IMF called for more cooperative efforts between the IMF, the
World Bank, and the WTO to advance and quicken the pace of trade liberalization
in developing countries. See id. (stating that "trade reform was important in pro-
moting transparency and good governance-reducing the scope for administrative
discretion, incentives for lobbying for protection, and opportunities for rent seek-
ing"). See generally WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, REPORT OF WTO DIRECTOR
GENERAL TO WTO MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE (May 1998) (visited Nov. 15, 1998)
< http://www.ldcs.org/wtoreport.htm> (discussing the launch of a trade liberaliza-
tion program for least developed countries ("LDCs") involving the WTO, IMF,
International Trade Commission, UNCTAD, UNDP, and World Bank).
44. See generally James H. Mittelman, The Dynamics of Globalization, in
GLOBALIZATION 1, 1-9 (James H. Mittelman ed., 1996) (outlining the changing so-
cial, political, and economic dimensions-from a global division of labor to in-
creased democratization-felt around the world as a result of market liberalization
and integration efforts). The Group of 77, comprised of developing nations, re-
cently held a workshop on globalization in order to prepare a unified response to
advocates of this model. See Ambassador Oscar de Rojas, Intervention at the
SID/G77 Workshop on Globalization, Address at the SID/G77 Workshop on Glob-
alization (last modified May 6, 1998) <http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/
global/rojas.htm> (stating that in his view "globalization is and purports to be
nothing less than the triumphant, unabashed apotheosis of capitalism").
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East Asia, collectively known as the newly industrialized countries
("NJCs"). 4 The World Bank's Report concluded that four main fac-
tors contributed to the success of the economies in the region: mac-
roeconomic stability, extensive investment in social infrastructure,
efficient export-push efforts, and selective government intervention.'
Many scholars view the conclusion regarding State intervention as
the most telling aspect of this Report.47 In fact, they believe that such
government control during East Asia's early development was a sig-
nificant factor in the final equation," contrary to the World Bank's
conclusions.49
45. See generally THE WORLD BANK, supra note 36 (analyzing the major as-
pects of the East Asian experience, which the World Bank claims was the result of
its institutional policies). Certain mathematical analyses reveal that external factors
had little or nothing to do with the NIC phenomenon; rather, it was the internal
structure, social and political, that proved statistically significant in regression cal-
culations. See inf!'a notes 48-57 and accompanying text (discussing the role played
by external and internal factors in the NICs growth and criticizing the World Bank
Report's conclusions).
46. See Fishlow & Gwin, supra note 36, at 4-5 (listing the four growth factors
but de-emphasizing the role that State intervention played in initiating develop-
ment and its inclusion as an element in future models).
47. See, e.g., Stephan Haggard, Politics and Institutions in the World Bank s
EastAsia, in MIRACLE OR DESIGN?, supra note 36, at 81, 87-90 (using Indonesia,
Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand to argue that strong State governments were the rea-
son for the macroeconomic stability that led these countries to economic success).
48. See id. One scholar notes that there is a profound difference in the way that
the World Bank and East Asians view the role of government with respect to eco-
nomics. See Robert Wade, Selective Idustrial Policies in East Asia: Is The East
Asian Miracle Right?, in MIRACLE OR DESIGN?, supra note 36, at 55, 69-74 (con-
trasting the East Asian "ingredients" approach with the World Bank's "frame-
work" approach). The East Asian "ingredients" approach conceives the economy
as a whole-the structure of which is made up of multiple industries-the future
paths of which can be conducted through various stages of industrialization by ma-
nipulating industrial policies. See id. The World Bank's "framework" approach,
however, takes a more microcosmic view-entailing correcting price distortions
within industries to accommodate individual interests. See id.
49. See generally Wade, supra note 48, at 56-65 (asserting that the World Bank
report on the NICs was flawed for concluding that State policies were not effec-
tive). Wade discusses the reasons why the report was flawed, which are as follows:
first, the report utilized the "industrial structure test," which uses cross-country
figures to compare the NICs economies against average industrial structures, incor-
rectly assuming that free market forces alone would have propelled the East Asian
economies to meet the averages; second, the "total factors productivity test," which
the World Bank Report applied, as well, comparing growth in productivity be-
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These scholars assert that the State-directed policies helped mobi-
lize and effectively allocate resources in the calculated direction of
domestic industry, while extracting high performance through incen-
tive schemes. ° Their evidence indicates the various preferences, in-
cluding favorable credit options, trade terms, and price concessions,"
that East Asian governments provided to their domestic businesses,
which consists largely of State-Owned Enterprises ("SOEs") and
Chaebols-local cartels." Often, these preferences came in the form
of incentive-based contests run by the governments to bolster do-
mestic performance and meet export goals-a result that the World
Bank incorrectly assumed resulted solely from the export orientation
of the economy. 3 Moreover, the centralized governments in East
tween promoted and non-promoted industries, is irrelevant. See id.; see also Dani
Rodrik, King Kong Meets Godzilla: The World Bank and the East Asian Miracle,
in MIRACLE OR DESIGN?, supra note 36, at 13, 31-33 (discussing the inconsisten-
cies of using the "total factors productivity test"). Scholars opine that the World
Bank's fear of underlying its credibility as an intellectual leader drove it to de-
emphasize the State intervention factor. See, e.g., Wade, supra note 48, at 56 (pro-
posing this theory).
50. See Gary Gereffi, The Elusive Last Lap in the Quest for Developed-Country
Status, in GLOBALIZATION, supra note 44, at 53, 79 (discussing how East Asian
governments extracted local capital for domestic industry and helped establish
vertical linkages between exporters and suppliers).
51. See Haggard, supra note 47, at 94-95 (explaining that access to cheap in-
puts and domestic industry's protected status, through generous financing and sub-
sidies, were crucial components to the region's export growth); see also
MITTELMAN & PASHA, supra note 38, at 141-42 (referring to practices of providing
low interest rate loans to key industries as well as giving selective favorable treat-
ment to certain targeted industries).
52. See MITTELMAN & PASHA, supra note 38, at 142-45 (revealing a highly
domestic and government favored economy). 133 SOEs accounted for 10% of Ko-
rea's GNP, while 30 Chaebols accounted for 28% and 45% of Korea's total manu-
facturing capacity and total domestic capital, respectively. See id. 450 SOEs in
Singapore represented 21.4% of sales in the manufacturing sector in 1983. See id.
53. See Haggard, supra note 47, at 96 (asserting that contests were run on the
basis of a set of clear criteria with a strong enforcement mechanism). Scholars
criticize the World Bank Report for its failure to establish causal statistical links
between the export strategy, the fundamental stressed as most successful by the
World Bank, and the resulting domestic growth. See, e.g., Rodrik, supra note 49, at
33-34, 42 (criticizing the World Bank Report). Instead, the World Bank relied on
vague assumptions. See id. Furthermore, East Asian countries accomplished tech-
nological spillover-a much-hailed benefit of this export-oriented strategy-at
least in part through clever governmental schemes and pirating efforts. See id. at
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Asia utilized fiscal repression measures to protect domestic indus-
tries from excessive foreign competition."
Meanwhile, on the side of social justice, East Asian government
policies assured that the fruits of the resulting growth were shared
quite equitably among the population, a factor strongly stressed by
both scholars and the World Bank as a key to the NICs' successes."
Those people to whom the dividends did not fall as freely were sys-
tematically and structurally silenced by governments that transferred
their policy implementation powers to technocratic elite groups.
These groups were able to distribute rewards more efficiently than
the governments since they functioned free from the pressures of
politics.56 Accordingly, despite some flaws, development theorists
laud the World Bank Report for its candor on these issues.:
34-35 (citing studies on the spillover phenomenon, which demonstrate little evi-
dence and great ambiguity in the World Bank's theoretical argument); see also
Wade, supra note 48, at 75-76 (providing an example that occurred in Taiwan,
where the government utilized delay tactics for approving a foreign business' im-
port shipments to extract technological information for a domestic chemical pro-
ducer).
54. See MrITELMAN & PASHA, supra note 38, at 141-42, 145 (evidencing Ko-
rea's use of emergency tariffs and investment regulations and Singapore's use of
restrictive licensing practices to control foreign competition).
55. See Haggard, supra note 47, at 91-93 (discussing executive acts of good
will, including land reform and redistribution, the provision of low-income hous-
ing, and the favoring of certain disadvantaged, domestic ethnic groups).
56. See Rodrik, supra note 49, at 43 (highlighting the existence of technocratic
structures in East Asia, which made it easier to implement policies and distribute
rewards); see also Haggard, supra note 47, at 90 (stating that technocratic struc-
tures are a very important lesson in the NIC story and an important component of a
democratic society, as well). Strong governments in East Asia, also allowed most
of the NICs to splinter the power of unions, alleviating the upward pressure on
wages. See id. at 99-100. The fact that this elite group was able to collaborate with
the upper echelon of the business society in the form of deliberation councils was
also a key factor in the NICs miraculous growth, as it prevented indifference by the
technocrats in the outcome of such policies. See Rodrik, supra note 49, at 43. Al-
though, the southeast Asian NICs used less government-directed tactics than their
northern regional partners, one scholar explains that growth in the southern region
was probably the result of the so-called "neighborhood effect," a spillover from
northern Asian growth and policies. See Wade, supra note 48, at 65-69 (discussing
the regional arrangement where southeast Asian nations assumed an outward ori-
entation and began exporting goods manufactured largely with northeast Asian in-
puts); cf Walden Bello & Stephanie Rosenfeld, The Rise and Crisis of the Dragon
Economies, in DEVELOPMENT & UNDERDEVELOPMENT, supra note 14, at 421, 425
(stating that Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan all became dependent on Japan and
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Indeed, the Report's discussion of State-intervention is extremely
important in the context of the African Growth Act, particularly with
respect to the Act's reluctance to recognize strong governments."
Only nations that are willing to abide by the WTO and IMF market-
oriented rules attain trading status under the Act.59 Thus, the Act's
eligibility requirements are contrary to the NICs' policies and there-
fore may prevent preferential treatment of domestic investors, price
controls, subsidies, and other financial measures that ensure protec-
tion for domestic industries.6° Although proponents of the bill argue
that its provisions are flexible and non-binding,6' the United States,
the WTO, and the IMF have a history of prying markets open while
repressing government intervention therein.62 Further, despite experi-
ences of successful growth with less government intervention than
that employed by the NICs, 63 development experts assert that a
State's role is still important in the development process. Although
the State's role may have changed over the past few years in light of
modem circumstances, its importance to the development process
thus ran a huge trade deficit with Japan).
57. See Rodrik, supra note 49, at 33 (asserting that due to the World Bank's
acknowledgment it will no longer be plausible to argue that East Asian prosperity
was due to minimal government intervention).
58. See H.R. 1432, 105th Cong. sec. 4(8),(l0),(11) (1998) (calling for "mini-
mizing government intervention," increased "private ownership," and removing
restrictions on investment, respectively).
59. See id. secs. 4(b)(2)(B), 4(b)(3), 4(b)(4), 8(b)(1), 8(b)(2), 10(a), 10(c)(5)(B)
(mandating some level of compliance with either WTO or IMF policies).
60. See id. sec. 4(a)(6), (a)(8), (a)(l 1), (b)(2) (establishing anti-market-
intervention criteria, which the President will consider in determining a nation's
eligibility under this Act).
61. See Rep. Royce Remarks, supra note 21 (stating that the eligibility re-
quirements of the Africa Growth Act are merely suggestive-not binding).
62. See infra Part III.B (discussing the effects of IMF policies on Thailand);
infra note 92 (suggesting that external forces dominate the agendas of African na-
tions); see also 1998 IMF ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 43, at 51 (renewing the
IMF's aim to liberalize trade in the modem era).
63. See Michael T. Rock, "Twenty-five Years of Economic Development" Re-
visited, in WORLD DEVELOPMENT 1787, 1789 (1993) (concluding that growth epi-
sodes occurred in as many cases where inequality initially existed as where equal-
ity was a precondition). However, when initial conditions are more equitable
growth will reduce poverty to a greater extent than when initial conditions are of a
more unequal nature. See id. at 1796.
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has not diminished.6' The African Growth Act would," and IMF
structural adjustment programs do, place great pressure on sub-
Saharan nations to minimize overall government intervention.'
Regardless, virtually all development scholars agree that equitable
social conditions preceding periods of growth will lead to higher
quality growth. 7 For example, during the 1960s primary and secon-
dary schooling in the NICs was more prominent than in any other
developing society.6 At least one scholar asserts that this widespread
educational push accounted for ninety percent of the resultant growth
in certain parts of the region.69 Additionally, income and land distri-
butions within these East Asian countries were comparatively highly
equal.70 It is quite clear that political history and culture-namely, the
64. See generally Leo Panitch, Rethinking the Role of the State, 1997 INT'L
POL. ECON. Y.B. 83, 108-13 (1997) (reflecting on the changed role of the State).
Today, the international community requires States not to attempt control over the
means of production and capital flows but to restructure themselves in the form of
a more democratic, ideologically different set of institutions. See id. Many scholars
believe this lack of State power led to the sub-Saharan region's developmental
deficit. See, e.g., Rock, supra note 63, at 1792 (adopting this view).
65. See supra note 59 (citing the relevant provisions and language of the Act
that would minimize government intervention).
66. See discussion infra Part III.A (explaining why developing nations have
little discretion in setting market standards).
67. See Haggard, supra note 47, at 87 (stating that if there is a lesson to be
learned it is that wealth inequalities must be attacked as early as possible); Rock,
supra note 63, at 1797 (concluding that initial conditions substantially affect the
outcome of a development project).
68. See Rodrik, supra note 49, at 16 (using cross-country averages to show
nearly universal primary and high secondary schooling for the East Asian coun-
tries).
69. See id. at 22 (alleging that 90% of the growth in Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan,
and Thailand, and 75% of the growth in Japan were the result of a highly educated
population).
70. See id., at 19-26 (using statistical calculations to show that the initial
equality in the region explained a significant part of the growth in East Asia); Jef-
frey Sachs, Growth in Africa: It Can Be Done?, ECONOMIST, June 29, 1996, at 20
(citing studies that show cross-country growth is related to income conditions);
ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA, UNITED NATIONS, AFRICAN ALTERNATIVE
FRAMEWORK TO STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS FOR SocIo-EcONOMIC
RECOVERY AND TRANSFORMATION: A POPULAR VERSION 1-2 (Environmentally
Sustainable Dev. Proceedings Series No. 12, Ismail Serageldin & Richard Barrett
eds., 1995) [hereinafter AFRICAN ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK] (asserting African
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Confucian ethic-played the dominant role in creating the favorable
circumstances in this region.7'
Thus, upon consideration of the value of initial equitable social
conditions prior to periods of significant growth, sub-Saharan Africa
is at a clear disadvantage.72 Further, its societies lack the historical
unity, structure, and power necessary to effectuate change through
such East Asian methods. 73 Nonetheless, one lesson from the NICs
experience is that such growth-antecedent equitable conditions are
prerequisites for successful long-term growth. Delineating the eco-
nomic growth scenario helps to illustrate why this is the case. When
an economy is injected with large amounts of new capital, societal
distribution occurs along existing channels.7 4 If such channels do not
effect fair apportionment, the resulting social unrest creates an unat-
tractive investment environment. 5 In contrast, the African Growth
Act pushes market forces in advance of social equality, the underly-
nations must improve patterns of income distribution in order to develop success-
fully); Rock, supra note 63, at 1789 (citing various studies revealing that initial
wealth distributions influence subsequent trends of inequality).
71. See MITTELMAN & PASHA, supra note 38, at 136-40 (stating that Hong
Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan all prompted land reform measures
before the industrialization era). Some scholars contend that Confucian values, fo-
cusing on education, achievement, and family and communal sharing and solidar-
ity, assisted in economic growth. See generally Herman Kahn, The Confucian
Ethic and Economic Growth, in DEVELOPMENT & UNDERDEVELOPMENT, supra
note 14, at 169, 170-71 (providing an overview of the Confucian ethic and its ef-
fect on economic growth).
72. See AFRICAN ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK, supra note 70, at 298-300 (iden-
tifying the precarious state of education and high unemployment levels, among
other conditions, as symptoms of a social crisis in Africa that is one of the major
contributors to the socio-economic crisis currently plaguing the continent).
73. See MITTELMAN & PASHA, supra note 38, at 152-53 (summarizing the
unique structures of NIC governments and contending that increased democratiza-
tion in today's world will not permit Third World States to achieve the desired
changes through duplication of NIC methods). In short, the NICs methods, which
often relied on authoritarian governmental practices for their success, will not be
ripe for duplication. See id.
74. See Rodrik, supra note 49, at 23 (citing a study by Kevin Murphy, Andrei
Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, which implies that as long as existing channels ap-
pease the middle class-the natural source of demand for home-based manufactur-
ers-industrialization will occur with less potential strain).
75. See id. (citing a study of Japan, Taiwan, and Thailand, which indexes social
and political instability in the face of inequality).
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ing theory being that the products of economic growth will provide
the resources necessary to achieve such social equality."' As with any
wager, developing nations should have a choice as to whether or not
to accept the risk of failure inherent in such a tactic, which the Act
fails to provide.
Overall, the section above serves less as an argument for a specific
development model" and more as a basis for undercutting certain
mainstream views advocated by the IMF, the World Bank, and the
United States.7 ' The world can no longer claim that the NICs' experi-
ence was the result of purely liberalized market forces." East Asian
tactics, however, are less workable in today's global environment
where market-opening pressures subject government policies to a
more stringent level of international scrutiny." In addition, the
structure of the world economy and developing governments' eager-
ness to join the globalization movement are making rapid liberaliza-
tion an almost mandatory prerequisite for participation in the inter-
76. See 143 CONG. REc. E751-01, E751 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 1997) (statement of
Rep. Philip Crane) (declaring that private sector investment "must serve as the
catalyst for sub-Saharan African countries to compete in the global marketplace, to
become self-reliant, and to raise the standard of living for their people").
77. But see AFRICAN ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK, supra note 70, at 19-32
(proposing a long-term-focused development model for African nations that takes
into account the peculiarities and realities of each nation while ensuring the active
participation of all members of society).
78. Compare Theotonio Dos Santos, The Structure of Dependence, in
DEVELOPMENT & UNDERDEVELOPMENT, supra note 14, at 193, 200-02 (arguing
that transnational corporations dominate world economic relations, leading to de-
veloping economies that respond to foreign interests rather than domestic interests,
are exploited for cheap labor and profits are repatriated, forming a dependence to-
wards developed nations that dominate the world economy), with Immanuel Wal-
lerstein, The Present State of the Debate on World Inequality, in DEVELOPMENT &
UNDERDEVELOPMENT, supra note 14, at 217, 226-30 (describing a model in which
the global economy is one capitalistic entity where nations make up the subparts of
the economy and where economic fluctuations are natural).
79. See supra notes 46-56 and accompanying text (discussing the multiple tac-
tics East Asian governments utilized to control their respective economies and de-
velopment).
80. See Haggard, supra note 47, at 106-08 (arguing that both the developed na-
tions and multinational corporations are exerting stronger market-opening force in
the present era, making it harder for other developing countries to utilize NIC tac-
tics without answering to worldwide pressure).
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national market.8' Accordingly, the next section examines how the
IMF and the WTO have increased control over developing nations
and institutionalized the trade liberalization approach in world poli-
tics.
III. THE NEO-CLASSICAL PARADIGM
A. MULTINATIONAL INSTITUTIONS' INCREASING POWER OVER
THE LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES LEADS TO LIMITED
DEVELOPMENTAL OPTIONS FOR THE COUNTRIES
Due in large part to the debt crisis of the 1980s, the IMF's power82
over recipient countries--often the least developed countries
("LDCs")-increased significantly." With an inflated budget and the
desperation of developing economies to achieve stability after the
crisis, the IMF's role as a provider increased in importance. Thus, the
IMF amended its Articles to include the power of surveillance over
economic policy.84 In fact, the IMF asserts that it adopted the policy
81. See discussion infra Part III.A (exposing the coercive force of the interna-
tional global market towards a free market paradigm).
82. Compare NASSAU A. ADAMS, WORLDS APART: THE NORTH-SOUTH DIVIDE
AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 29 (1993) (stating that the IMF was originally
established to stabilize countries' exchange rates in the short term), with Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, The IMF At A Glance (last modified Aug. 1998) <http://
www.imf.org/extemal/np/exr/facts/glance.htm> (listing the IMF's duties today as
surveillance, financial assistance in the medium term, and technical assistance).
The World Bank, as well, now offers development financing, rather than recon-
struction financing as originally envisioned, and its role now overlaps to a certain
extent with the IMF). Cf ADAMS, supra, at 31-33 (stating that many development
scholars view the modem roles of these institutions as a mediator of North-South
relations).
83. See generally ADAMS, supra note 82, at 150-53 (discussing the IMF's in-
creased power via measures taken against non-OECD countries). Adams, specifi-
cally outlines how non-OECD countries quickly built up large debt positions after
the oil shock of the 1970s. See id. The IMF imposed various austerity measures to
ensure repayment of outstanding debts, and thus, earned substantial profits, subse-
quently increasing power as a result. See id. at 154-55 (noting, however, that re-
cipient economies collapsed in recession and suffered rather severely). Because the
United States has been and remains quite influential in the IMF decision-making
process, the United States' power over developing countries has increased as well.
See id.
84. See International Monetary Fund, The Role of the IMF.- Financing and its
Interactions with Adjustment and Surveillance-Introduction (visited Apr. 16, 1999)
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of increased surveillance over economic policy in developing coun-
tries to bolster "transparency."" This surveillance power led to the
further practice of offering technical policy advice to recipients as
well as non-recipients of IMF loans."' Rigid implementation condi-
tions that attach to IMF loans, however, in effect make such advice
mandatory." Moreover, for the world's poorest nations, most of
which are African,88 the IMF created additional conditions imposed
through a recent program called the Enhanced Structural Adjustment
Facility ("ESAF").8 9
To some extent, the IMF's tightening of control can be justified
due to the recent increased assistance it has provided to developing
countries. High expectations and reliance on IMF programs in the
past, however, led to the overburdening of government agendas.'
Consequently, sub-Saharan governments find themselves more ac-
countable to international creditors than to their own citizens.' As
<http:lvww.imf.orglextemallpubs/ft/pampam50lpam5Oint.htm> (explaining the
amendment which will allow the IMF to carry out its "responsibilities to seek to
avoid and help to correct maladjustments in countries' balance of payments").
85. 1998 IMF ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 43, at 49.
86. See International Monetary Fund, supra note 84 (listing the IMF's various
roles, including surveillance and providing financial as well as technical advice to
countries).
87. See 1998 IMF ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 43, at 50 ("In April 1998, the
Interim committee endorsed the central of the IMF, in particular its role in sup-
porting the necessary reforms through conditionality.").
88. See Rock, supra note 63, at 1789 (noting that 22 of the 36 poorest countries
in the world are sub-Saharan African nations).
89. See 1998 IMF ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 43, at 53 (describing the En-
hanced Structural Adjustment Facility Agreement as "provid[ing] support in the
form of highly concessional loans to low-income member countries facing pro-
tracted balance of payments problems"). See generally Diana E. Moller, Interven-
tion, Coercion, or Justifiable Need? A Legal Analysis of Structural Adjustment
Lending in Costa Rica, 2 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 483 (1995) (offering an in-depth
analysis of the intrusive nature of conditionality loans by the IMF and concluding
that the IMF approach is not successful).
90. See Vicki Waye, The Constituent Objectives of Development-Zimbabwe
Case Study, 28 INT'L LAW. 385, 396-99 (1994) (tracing the decline in Zimbabwe's
social order after the implementation of a World Bank Structural Adjustment Pro-
gram-creating a strong opposition to the ESAF's ineffectual policies).
91. See Fantu Cheru, News' Social Movements: Democratic Struggles and Hu-
man Rights in Africa, in GLOBALIZATION, supra note 44, at 145, 150 (arguing that
African governments effectively have lost their capacity to manage their domestic
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such, sub-Saharan governments often tend to neglect the pressing
domestic social needs of their countries.
In addition to the IMF's heightened control, the World Trade Or-
ganization holds the keys to the global trading channels, the only
means for sub-Saharan countries to break out of their third world
status and escape IMF dependence. 93 Yet, the WTO's powerful mar-
ket-liberalizing agenda is obvious.94 Thus, many scholars' powerful
arguments for slower growth in Africa95 may never advance to frui-
tion given the WTO's philosophy of emphasizing reciprocal trade
concessions rather than trade preferences. Additionally, in its May
1998 Ministerial Conference, the WTO adopted an integrated
framework for developing countries, which aggressively urges them
to seek membership. 96 As a result, many African countries are joining
the regime, further increasing pressure on non-members to conform
in order to avoid falling behind.97
B. FAILURE OF THE MODERN PARADIGM IN EAST ASIA AND OTHER
REGIONS AND COUNTRIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD
In the 1990s, the IMF promotes a formula of indiscriminate capital
account liberalization as one prescription for successful economic
affairs).
92. See Waye, supra note 90, at 399 (asserting that the trade liberalization and
deregulation model imposed by the World Bank did not address the nation's
structural inequalities because the Bank did not implement the basic needs ap-
proach as it declared it would).
93. See All Free Traders Now?, supra note 4, at 21 (stating that membership in
the WTO has increased dramatically over the last several years as developing
countries seek to reap the benefits of freer trade).
94. See id. (discussing the WTO's "free trading commitment" and challenge
"to continue liberalising [sic] trade in goods and services"); cf 1998 IMF ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 43, at 51-52 (calling for a cooperative effort between the
WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank to quicken the pace of liberalization in the
future).
95. See, e.g., AFRICAN ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK, supra note 70 (advocating
for a gradual approach that links sectors and results in more equitable growth).
96. See generally WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 43 (discussing
the trade liberalization program the WTO established where LDC's participate
more fully in the implementation of the WTO framework).
97. See id. at I (declaring that thirty-four LDC's decided to join the program
and more are expressing interest).
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development, adopted most notably by the East Asian nations.?' After
a massive deregulation effort spawned by IMF pressure, Thailand,
after 1993, became the model of this approach.' Within the next
three years, approximately fifty billion American dollars flooded the
very liquid Thai economycl Recent unstable market conditions,
however, spurred the exodus of foreign private investors from the
Thai market.1 'O As a result of these conditions, havoc reigned over the
Thai economy as well as other East Asian nations, and the GDP
growth in Thailand fell to negative 3.5% as of February 1998.' o1 This
occurrence, however, is not unique to Thailand or the East Asian re-
gion. 3 IMF-related freefalls occurred in countries such as in Mo-
zambique, Costa Rica, the Philippines, and Indonesia.
For example, in Mozambique the IMF stabilization strategy failed,
thereby worsening the condition of the country and causing many
IMF allies to criticize the organization's strategy. ' 0) In Costa Rica,
98. See International Monetary Fund: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Gen-
eral Oversight and Investigations of the House Conin. on Banking and Financial
Services, 105th Cong. 1 (1998) (statement of Walden Bello, National Chairman,
Akbayan Party) [hereinafter IMF Hearings] (discussing the capital account liber-
alization strategy, which allowed a massive influx of foreign capital to enter the
East Asian markets).
99. See id. at 2 (highlighting the rapid transition of the Thai economy from a
highly regulated market to a completely liberalized economy with few government
controls).
100. See id. at 3 (noting some twenty-four billion American dollars in highly
liquid capital flooding an economy that had very little experience in dealing with
such large amounts of money).
101. See id. (explaining how leveraging an economy through foreign capital can
prove disastrous if the market becomes panicky). Between 1988 and 1996, Thai-
land's debt bloated from $21 billion to S89 billion without eliciting even a warning
from IMF officials. See id. at 191.
102. See IMF Hearings, supra note 98, at 4-5 (tracing the negative progression
of the Thai economy after the fallout). Thailand's government estimates that the
crisis translates into a negative 6.5% annual drop in GDP in the second quarter of
1998. See id.
103. See generally WORLD BANK, ADJUSTMENT IN AFRICA: REFORM, RESULTS
AND THE ROAD AHEAD (1994) (discussing the slower growth in agricultural pro-
duction of African countries after instituting IMF structural adjustment policies).
104. See generally Joseph Hanlon, Strangling Mozambique: International
Monetary Fund "Stabilization" in the World's Poorest Countr)y, MULTINATIONAL
MONITOR, July/Aug. 1996, at 17 (stating how IMF allies are calling the IMF's
policies senseless and excessive).
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IMF conditionalities caused domestic levels of production, employ-
ment, and wages to severely decline.' ° Similarly, the Philippines re-
alized the highest poverty rates among non-communist Asian nations
after implementing IMF policies.' 6 Finally, in Indonesia, 118.5 mil-
lion people, 60.6% of the population, currently live under the poverty
line after the imposition of an IMF reform program.107
Despite external attempts to explain the downturns experienced in
Thailand and other countries, certain IMF officials pinned responsi-
bility upon their own ineffective policies.' 8 Moreover, the East Asian
crisis generally demonstrates that an underlying trend of irresponsi-
ble financial management practices seems to precipitate when private
creditors and borrowers are given unregulated access to markets free
of responsibility of the consequences of a possible recession, due to
the IMF's acquired bailout role.'09 In other words, relinquishing
nearly all governmental control over capital flows and market forces
tends to produce economic backlashes. "0
105. See generally Moller, supra note 89, at 501-14 (discussing the harsh reality
and prescription type format of IMF conditionalities upon Costa Rica, which ended
up worse off in the long run).
106. See IMF Hearings, supra note 98, at 8 (examining the IMF's effects on the
Philippines).
107. See id. at 8 (examining the Indonesian freefall).
108. See id. at 5 (stating that Hubert Neiss, the IMF's Asia-Pacific Director, ad-
mitted that the IMF's policies played a role in the Thai economy's collapse). The
IMF also revealed in an internal memo that the Indonesian banking crisis resulted
from its own directive, See id. Davison Budhoo, a former senior manager at the
World Bank, once stated that "everything we did from 1983 onward was based
upon our new sense of mission to have the south privatized or die; towards this end
we ignominiously created economic bedlam in Latin America and Africa." Bren-
dan Martin, Gains Without Frontiers: Global Privatization, in 7 NEW STATESMAN
& SOCIETY 22, 23 (Statesman and Nation Publishing Co., 1994).
109. See IMF Hearings, supra note 98, at 4 (statement of Ian Vasquez, Project
Director, Cato Institute) (testifying that both private lenders and government regu-
latory bodies wittingly miscalculated the risk of their portfolios knowing that the
IMF would bail them out in case of trouble). This "Moral Hazard" dissuades bene-
ficiary governments from altering their macroeconomic policies to alleviate resul-
tant problems. See id. at 3.
110. See Rodrik, supra note 49, at 42-43 (demonstrating that government-set
policies played a large role in managing successful development of the East Asian
region); see also Moller, supra note 89, at 505 (concluding that an open market re-
gime only works properly in a perfect or near perfect capital market, which eludes
most LDCs).
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The above analysis proves important when considering the African
Growth Act's eligibility requirements mandating compliance with
IMF policies and sub-Saharan government's removal of "restrictions
on investment.""' Thus, the African Growth Act essentially would
force qualifying sub-Saharan African nations to adopt this potentially
destructive Neo-Classical framework. Unfortunately, many African
governments will likely submit under international pressures to these
mainstream ideals, despite the silent pleas of those who are being
disadvantaged by globalization."2 Historical crises induced by the
Neo-Classical model highlight a trend towards the exploitation of in-
digent classes all over the world. Therefore, the harsh realities of to-
day's world economic paradigm as well as the relative success of
other development models-namely, the NICs model-justify the
fear of a wholesale acceptance of the modem framework. Accord-
ingly, it is reasonable to demand some form of legal protection be
made available to nations who decide to protect their domestic con-
stituencies by adopting appropriate internal measures."'
111. H.R. 1432, 105th Cong. sec. 4(a)(l 1) (1998). Some opponents of the Act
fear that this broad language seeks to remove all restrictions on investment, re-
sulting in a regime where foreign investors receive equal treatment-a provision
contained within the OECD's Multilateral Agreement on Investment. See Tran-
sAfrica, supra note 20 (criticizing the Act "requiring African governments to cede
their ability to shape foreign investment to best suit their broad public interests);
see also H.R. 1432, 105th Cong. sec. 4(a)(6) (1998) (including "national treatment
for foreign investors" as an eligibility factor). Even viewing this issue in the light
most favorable to proponents, the fact that the Act mandates compliance with the
IMF's policies-which push investment liberalization-supports the hypothesis
that sub-Saharan Africa will have to comply. See discussion supra Part III.A
(demonstrating the increased stronghold that the IMF has gained over developing
nations). Furthermore, minimizing a sub-Saharan government's ability to tax ex-
cess profits of foreign corporations would hurt the country's ability to "fund es-
sential public services." TransAfrica, supra note 20.
112. See Martin Khor, WTO Parti, Marred By Anti-Globalization Protests (vis-
ited Apr. 16, 1999) <http:/vvww.twnside.org.sg/southsitqVttitlel I 753-cn.htm> (de-
scribing a recent protest by more than 10,000 people from all over the world at a
WTO Ministerial Conference who were rallying against the social dislocation
caused by free trade). A recent study demonstrates that over a long period of time
trade liberalization and corporate influence have negative effects upon develop-
ment. See Volker Bornschier & Christopher Chase-Dunn, Transnational Penetra-
tion and Economic Growth, in DEVELOPMENT & UNDERDEVELOPMENT, supra note
14, at 239, 242-60 (demonstrating that transnational penetration over the long run
slows investment, which results in the decline of developing economies).
113. See discussion infra Part V (outlining the legal protection that should exist
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IV. MODERN SELF-DETERMINATION
Over the past several years, scholars, governments, and inter-
governmental organizations alike have heavily scrutinized the right
to self-determination." 4 Although the colonial conception of self-
determination has arguably attained the level ofjus cogens,' ' it is the
scope of the right's modem meaning in the face of changed circum-
stances in the international community that has left analysts unde-
cided on the implications of this right."
6
Due to colonial imperialism, self-determination initially repre-
sented a form of protection from external discrimination against a
particular homogeneous group." 7 Legitimately exercising self-
determination in this context usually resulted either in secession to
form a new independent entity or in unification with an existing en-
tity."8 In the post-colonial era, however, because of the potentially
for disadvantage nations).
114. See Hurst Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 6-
15 (1993) (providing and developing the multitude of positions that States and
scholars have expressed over the years regarding the modem meaning of self-
determination).
115. See id. at 2 (stating that no norm of international law has been so widely
accepted as that of self-determination); see also Lung-Chu Chen, Self-
Determination and World Public Order, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1287, 1288
(1991) (discussing the international law community's wide acceptance of the con-
cept of self-determination).
116. See Eric Kolodner, The Future of the Right to Self-Determination, 10
CONN. J. INT'L L. 153, 157 (1994) (contending that the legal status of the right is
rather unclear, and that although the international community highly respects the
general right, there is confusion about which aspect of the right should qualify as a
customary norm).
117. See Hannum, supra note 114, at 2-3 (revealing the history of self-
determination, which grew out of the ethnic and linguistic political demands in
earlier centuries). Self-determination became the means by which these earlier eth-
nic groups organized politically. See id.
118. See id. at 39-57 (providing a comprehensive analysis of the debate over
whether self-determination should include the right to secession). Issues of the de-
bate include, whether a qualifying group can unilaterally declare secession to attain
independence, and whether remedies other than secession are viable in light of the
disruptiveness of secession in such an interconnected world. See id. Some scholars
believe that broadening the definition of self-determination may result in an inces-
sant cycle of demands for secession. See, e.g., Kolodner, supra note 116, at 159-60
(advocating this theory).
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extreme international consequences of exercising such forms of self-
determination in an increasingly interconnected world,"9 serious de-
bates concerning the definition of "self,"' 20 the implications of em-
ploying the right, and other possible remedies besides secession
erupted in an effort to clarify the concept. 2' Some scholars even ad-
vocate the complete disposition of this right outside of the de-
colonization context." Currently, there is no consensus on the issue
in the international community.'
The enactment of two widely-accepted international instruments,
the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
("ICESCR")'2 4 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights ("ICCPR"),' 25 sheds some light on this controversy for many
scholars. The first Articles of both instruments read: "[a]ll peoples
have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their eco-
119. See Hannum, supra note 114, at 30-31 (stating that nearly all African gov-
ernments adopted a very narrow definition of self-determination due to the extreme
heterogeneous nature of their societies).
120. See id. at 37-39 (discussing a European Community debate on the defini-
tion of self, which utilized a territorial approach). This approach utilized the group
by territorial boundaries to arrive at a definition of self in the Yugoslavian context.
See id. However, this approach neglected many ethnic groups within territorial
borders that would have been included had an ethnicity approach been used. See
id.
121. See id. at 1 (stating that the modem conception of self-determination is still
quite vague).
122. See Kolodner, supra note 116, at 157 (opining that some international
scholars feel that international law should no longer recognize this right as it was a
creature of the colonial era).
123. See id. (discussing the unclear status of self-determination in today's legal
environment).
124. G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc.
A/6136 (1966) [hereinafter ICESCR]. See generally J. Oloka-Onyango, Beyond the
Rhetoric: Reinvigorating the Struggle for Economic and Social Rights in, Africa, 26
CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 1, 25-26 (1995) (advocating heightened recognition of the
ICESCR, which has been given less attention than the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, because structural adjustment programs have deterio-
rated the economic and social rights of Africans).
125. G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc.
A/6136 (1966) [hereinafter ICCPR].
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nomic, social and cultural development."'26 This declaration has at
least two important implications. First, it implies the continued rec-
ognition of self-determination beyond the de-colonization context.127
Second, it links self-determination with the human rights corpus of
international law by transferring the right to individuals, as opposed
to groups.128
Some scholars opine that the transfer of the right to individuals
implies the bifurcation of self-determination into two separate parts:
external self-determination and internal self-determination. 129 The
external component effectively encompasses the traditional under-
standing of self-determination, which includes the issue of seces-
sion.'30 On the other hand, the internal element enshrines a more hu-
manistic quality by endowing all peoples with certain fundamental
democratic rights.' The scope and meaning of the exercise of inter-
nal self-determination remains uncertain. 3 2 This ambiguity and flexi-
bility, however, may prove advantageous to certain groups within the
126. Id. at 52, ICESCR, supra note 124, at 49.
127. See Oloka-Onyango, supra note 124, at 11 (supporting the continuation of
self-determination by requiring States to report the activities they undertake to
further the rights contained in the instrument).
128. See Hannum, supra note 114, at 57-59 (noting that the ICESCR and the
ICCPR, in effect, link self-determination with the corpus of human rights).
129. See, e.g., id. at 66 (inferring the existence of an internal element of self-
determination because of the notion that secession is not necessary-a State may
take certain internal steps to prevent an outcry for secession); see also Kolodner,
supra note 116, at 159-66 (explaining the characteristics of both internal and ex-
ternal components of self-determination).
130. See Kolodner, supra note 116, at 159 (relating the issue of secession to the
external component of self-determination). Internal self-determination is a more
peaceful, and thus preferable, alternative to succession. See id. at 162.
131. See Hannum, supra note 114, at 57-59 (stating that certain traditional hu-
man rights have, as a result of the two covenants, been combined with self-
determination to form an instrument that encompasses certain democratic ideals, as
well as normal human rights issues).
132. See Kolodner supra note 116 (recognizing the lack of clarity with regard to
the status of self-determination). Kolodner and other scholars believe that self-
determination should be fused with human rights norms to prevent State abuses.
See, e.g., id., at 67-69.
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international community since the right's meaning can be adapted to
the altering conditions of the world order."'
Presently, however, the notion of self-determination bears several
limitations preventing its potential benevolent use. First, the defini-
tion of "self' appears to only include a homogeneous group defined
by a common territory, a distinct heritage, ethnicity, language, or re-
ligion.1M Second, beyond secession/unification or the grant of power
to a qualifying group, the sole existing enforcement mechanism for
internal self-determination is the practice of reporting, a procedure
by which States are required to submit annual reports regarding
measures taken to ensure the panoply of rights guaranteed by the in-
ternational instruments.3 3 The primary purpose behind State report-
ing is to keep the international community informed so that it may
advise an offending State on how to resolve any dispute before a dis-
sident group demands independence.' 6 Such peaceful resolutions are
sympathetic to the highly interconnected world that exists today and
more reflective of a human rights approach.'" Reporting, however, is
generally ineffective because many participating sub-Saharan nations
fail to carry out their reporting duties, and no enforcement mecha-
nism dissuades such conduct."3
133. See Hannum, supra note 114, at 58 (arguing that "the right to participate
effectively in the political and economic life of one's country.. .[is] likely to be-
come an increasingly important focus of human rights activists and theorists in the
future").
134. See id. at 35-39 (analyzing the multitude of definitions that various States
and instruments have used to determine what groups the "self' element covers).
Although the inclusion of indigent groups in this definition is a novel proposition,
the spirit of self-determination arguably would support this addition. See id. at 61
(stating that "it is when a group's very identity is threatened-by denial of the
group's existence, seizure of its lands, or denigration of its culture--that salvation
is sought through political and economic self-determination").
135. See Oloka-Onyango, supra note 124, at 11 (revealing that reporting is the
only implementation mechanism for the ICESCR). This enforcement mechanism,
however, has not proven to be very useful in the past as many nations simply ne-
glect the practice. See id. at 15.
136. See Kolodner, supra note 116, at 162 (noting that there seems to be a pref-
erence in the international community for exercising internal measures before re-
sorting to a claim for independence through external self-determination).
137. See id. (arguing that secession is less preferable in today's highly integrated
world).
138. See Oloka-Onyango, supra note 124, at 15 (stating that over half of the
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Despite this ineffective reporting mechanism, many scholars ap-
plaud the new internally focused interpretation of self-determination
contained within the ICESCR and ICCPR.3 9 This Comment, how-
ever, argues that the modem construction of internal self-
determination is not adequate to deal with the harsh realties of to-
day's international climate. Whereas in the earlier part of this century
political oppression plagued the world order, economic domination
presently lies at the heart of the global dilemma. 40 Today, oppression
of the lower classes takes the place of ethnic persecutions of the
past.141 That is not to say that ethnic discrimination has altogether
ceased, but that, as a result of a change in the world order from a bi-
polar/adversarial system to a cooperative system, the victims of
global subjugation have changed. International law must also change
to reflect such modem transformations. 142 The next section recom-
mends the legal modifications necessary for successful economic de-
velopment in sub-Saharan Africa.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
As discussed above, the right of self-determination evolved out of
the necessity to protect victims of the colonial world order.' 43 Today,
there are new victims in the modem world order. For example, in the
present era, there is a growing trend of economic stratification be-
tween the world's wealthy and Africa's impoverished peoples.'"
countries that have acceded to the ICESCR have overdue reports).
139. See, e.g., Kolodner, supra note 116 (supporting an internally focused inter-
pretation); Hannum, supra note 114 (recognizing internal self-determination).
140. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text (discussing the increasing
exploitation of Africa's lower classes).
141. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (examining the increasing gap
between African citizens' income and rich nations income).
142. See generally Kolodner, supra note 116 (arguing for a new modem con-
ception of self-determination); Hannum, supra note 114 (arguing for a more hu-
man-rights based approach to self-determination).
143. See generally Hannum, supra note 114, at 11-17 (tracing the origin of ex-
ternal self-determination). Hannum asserts that twentieth century decolonization
caused the vague "principle" of self-determination to evolve into a "right." Id. at
12.
144. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text (revealing the increasing
disparity of wealth).
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Global resources are becoming more concentrated in the hands of an
elite group."5 Despite what some theories and scholars might suggest
about future conditions resulting from modem economic policies, the
reality is that Africa's lower classes are growing and suffering.
Self-determination is the only answer. The common index of hu-
man rights will not suffice,'"6 and international law need only take a
few steps to bridge the gap between modem internal self-
determination and a conception that would lead to the protection of
the poor in developing countries. Because sub-Saharan Africa's con-
ditions are uniquely depressed with respect to the rest of the globe,
any new protective instruments should begin with this region.
The first step would be to draft an international instrument ex-
panding the scope of the definition of "self' to include indigent peo-
ples. 47 These groups share a common characteristic of poverty and
often represent distinct sectors of given societies-as nations begin
to liberalize their economies, certain sectors will suffer at the ex-
pense of others. 41 In this light, such disadvantaged sectors should
qualify under the purview of the definition of "self." Moreover, the
ICESCR and ICCPR both recognize all peoples as beneficiaries of
this right. 49 Although this may seem somewhat over-inclusive, im-
plicating millions of people around the world, a modification in the
"determination" element of self-determination-the second step-
would soften the blow.
145. See WORLD BANK, supra note 103, at 7 (stating that many of the richest
countries in the world are transnational corporations).
146. See Hannum, supra note 114, at 61 (stating that, common humanitarian
norms may address minority complaints of discrimination, physical violence, and
land seizures, but they do not adequately respond to economic demands).
147. See supra note 134 (revealing that it would not stretch the purpose of self-
determination beyond its intended scope by including indigent groups in the defi-
nition of "self').
148. See, e.g., Office of Statistics, U. S. Census Bureau, U.S. Trade With Kenya
in 1998 (visited Feb. 21, 1999) <http://www.census.gov/foreign-tradelsitcl/
1998/c7790.html> (revealing that out of ten export categories to the United States,
only three have sustained any increase over the year, suggesting that some markets
remain untapped and marginalized).
149. See supra text accompanying note 126 (providing the text of the identical
first Articles of the ICESCR and the ICCPR, which expressly include "all peo-
ples").
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This proposed vision of self-determination would allow an African
State, based upon a multilateral assessment by a non-partisan organi-
zation, to employ mild protective measures. These measures could
include increased tariffs on foreign exports or enhanced tax rates for
high-grossing foreign businesses-in violation of the African
Growth Act's free-trade policies-to correct any social imbalance
caused by market-opening forces.'5° This would reinforce the inter-
national preference for peaceful dispute resolution over violent re-
volts. Further, this concept of self-determination would provide spe-
cial force to the people-focused commitment currently undertaken by
African nations in the Banjul Charter."'
Although the modem notion of self-determination envisions indi-
viduals as the right-holders, the State becomes accountable for the
actualization of such rights. Article two, paragraph one of the
ICESCR states that, "[e]ach State Party to the present Covenant un-
dertakes to take steps, individually and through international assis-
tance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the
maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving pro-
gressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present
Covenant... ,,52 Therefore, the ICESCR makes the State responsible
for ensuring the participation of its peoples in the economic devel-
opment of the nation.' Thus, although the individuals are the rights
holders, the State becomes the enforcer of these rights. Under this
proposed scheme, Article One of the ICESCR, which states the right
of economic participation, takes life. Under the traditional State re-
porting mechanism, governments are only required to implement
Articles Six through Fifteen of the ICESCR-Articles One through
Five are merely ceremonious. 1 4 Further, although the proposed con-
150. See AFRICAN ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK, supra note 70, at 24 (suggesting
a similar proposition, which proposes a multi-tiered exchange rate system to en-
courage certain sectors of the economy).
151. See Mutua, supra note 38, at 370 (1995) (discussing Africa's Banjul Char-
ter, which contains language that calls for national unity, solidarity, and security as
a shield against foreign occupation).
152. ICESCR, supra note 124, art. 2, para. 1.
153. Cf supra note 135 (discussing the State reporting mechanism under the
ICESCR).
154. See Oloka-Onyango, supra note 124, at 12 (noting the implementation se-
quence for Article Six and the remaining Articles of the ICESCR).
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ception would violate the one-time-application rule inherent in exter-
nal self-determination, it would make internal self-determination
comparable to other humanitarian rights, which may be exercised re-
peatedly with every violation.'""
Since this broadened proposed definition of self-determination
holds the potential for increased abuse, the minimum hurdle for le-
gitimately exercising this right should be set rather high.'" The des-
ignated overseeing body should assess this floor based upon a cost-
benefit analysis, which would weigh the costs imposed upon the
complainant African nation against the benefits accrued by foreign
presence in that nation.' If foreigners benefit excessively while pov-
erty is rampant throughout the nation, equitable development-a
supposed aim of the African Growth Act' 5 -will not occur. Thus,
corporations must understand the need to contribute to the commu-
nities in which they are situated.
CONCLUSION
Sub-Saharan Africa's poor need a weapon to protect themselves
from the crushing force of globalization. The governments of these
nations are more likely to join the globalization movement due to
factors discussed throughout this Comment, including but not limited
to the increased dominance of the IMF and the WTO, the creation of
unilateral treaties like the African Growth Act, and the international
political pressure to seek integration. All of these factors combine to
leave sub-Saharan governments with little choice over developmen-
tal options for their countries' economies. Accordingly, international
155. See generally Hannum, supra note 114, at 41-55 (stating that external self-
determination is a right that can only be exercised once because of its effect of cre-
ating a new entity).
156. See Kolodner, supra note 116, at 163 (urging that a high level of depriva-
tion exist before allowing internal self-determination, due to the potential abuse of
creating such a right).
157. See AFRICAN ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK, supra note 70, at 7 (highlighting
the central principles of the Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development
of Africa for 1980-2000). African leaders created this plan as a means of ensuring
the well-being of its people and creating self-reliance among fellow nations. See id.
158. See H.R. 1432, 105th Cong. secs. 2, 3 (1998) (stating that the purpose be-
hind the African Growth Act is to promote economic self-reliance as well as eco-
nomic and social development).
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law should provide some form of defense for these governments
against forced development. This Comment concludes that the
ICESCR and ICCPR are the weapons of choice. These instruments
currently provide the infrastructure for such protection.
